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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
PROFESSORS CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILcox.
ACCOMPLICES.

People v. Coffey, Cal., 119 Pac. 901. The Giver and Recipient of a Bribe.
The defendant was indicted for agreeing to receive and receiving a bribe. He
was a member of the board of supervisors. Another member of the board, testifying under a promise of immunity, swore that he offered the defendant $4,000
for his vote in the matter of the over-head trolley, that defendant agreed to
vote for the franchise, and did so and that the witness paid the defendant the
$4,000.00. It was proved by the testimony of independent witnesses that the
defendant voted in favor of the ordinance relating to the over-head trolley system, and that a fund was paid by the street railway company into the hands
of the man from whom the principal witness for the State testified that he
received it. Held that as the guilty act of two persons was necessary to constitute an agreement to receive the bribe, and as the principal witness for the
State, by offering the bribe, became "an actual participant in the crime, as well
as an aider, abettor, adviser and encourager in its commission," he was an accomplice. The fact that the penal code made it a separate offense to offer or
give a bribe, did not prevent the witness from being an accomplice in the crime
of agreeing to receive one. As there was no evidence, excepting that of the
accomplice, that the defendant entered into a corrupt agreement, or that he
received any money for his vote, the conviction was in violation of the statutory provision "that a conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence." Hence the conviction should
be reversed.
AsSAULT AND BATTERY.

Luther v. State, Ind. 98 N. E. 640. Intent. An assault and battery may be
committed upon one riding on a bicycle by another driving an automobile in
unison with the bicycle, since the force need not be direct, but intent is an
essential element of the offense.
Intent by an automobile driver to commit an assault and battery by drivinghis car against another may be inferred from circumstances legitimately permitting it, as by intentional acts directly causing the injury done under reckless
disregard of the safety of others, or the commission of an unlawful act naturally leading to such injury, but intent to injure cannot be implied from a lack
of ordinary care.
BIBERY.
United States v. Van Wert, 195 Fed. 974. Meaning of "Officer of the
United States." Under Const. art. 2, sec. 2, providing for the appointment of
officers of the United States, an "officer of the United States" within Pen.
Code, sec. 1V (Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1109; U. S. Comp. St. Supp.
1911, pp. 1623), punishing the acceptance of bribes by the president by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, or by the president alone, the courts of
law or heads of some executive department of the government, and a special
officer appointed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the suppression of
the liquor traffic among the Indians, is not an "officer of the United States."
Pen. Code, sec. 117 (Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1109; U. S. Comp
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St. Supp. 1911, p. 1623), punishing any officer of the United States accepting
a bribe to influence official action, is highly penal and must be construed at least
with reasonable strihtness, and unless the act charged to have been done by
accused is a violation of some act of Congress or some departmental rule or
regulation authorized by Congress, the violation of which is declared by it to
be an offense, no crime has been committed.
BURGLARY.

People ex. rel. Hurbert v. Kaiser, Warden, 135 N. Y. Supp. 274. Meaning
of "Break." Penal law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40) sec. 400, defines the word
"break" as breaking or violently detaching any part, internal or external, of a
building, opening any outer door of a building, or any window, shutter, scuttle, or other thing closing an opening, or obtaining an entrance by or through
any pipe, chiminey or other opening. Held, that the admission that accused in
the night-time without invitation, right, or lawful occasion entered the dwelling
of another and therein committed an offense was sufficient to sustain a conviction of burglary in the first degree, notwithstanding he testified that he entered
by a basement gate, ash hoist, and cellar door, all of which he found open.
CARRYING WEAPONS.

Cheney v. State, Ga. App., 73 S. E. 617. Temporary Possession. A statute prohibited all persons from having or carrying about their persons, any
pistol or revolver outside of their own homes or places of business, without
first having obtained a license so to do. It was proved that the defendant had
a pistol in his possession on the public road of the county in which he was
indicted, and that he did not have the required license. The defense was that
the pistol had been left at his house by his neighbor, to whom it belonged, and
that he was carrying it to the house of the owner for the purpose of delivering
it to him, and was not carrying it about his person within the purview of the
statute. Held that if this were true, it would constitute no defense. While it
may be that the owner of a pistol that had fallen from the window of his
house on the public street might pick it up for the purpose of carrying it back
into his house without violating the statute, or that other like cases of emergency might occur, the construction contended for by the defendant would not
only make evasion of the statute easy, but would render the act practically ineffective.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

State v. Dawson, Kan., 119 Pac. 360. See that the Laws are Faithfully
Executed. The constitution provided that "the supreme executive power of the
State shall be vested in a governor, who shall see that the laws are faithfully
executed." A statute made it the duty of the county attorney or the attorney
general to issue subpoenas for such persons as he should have reason to believe
to have knowledge of any violation of the prohibitory law. A newspaper writer
had published an article, stating that there were habitual violations of this law
in certain cities. The governor directed the attorney general to examine this
writer. The attorney general refused to make the examination authorized by
the statute, stating that he had made pr'vate inquiries of the writer and satisfied himself that he had no information of value. The governor then brought
mandamus proceedings to compel the attorney general to make an investigation
under the statute. Held that the constitutional provision gave the governor
power to secure efficient execution of the laws. That the statutory investiga-
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tion was a cause or matter within the purview of a statute requiring an attorney general to appear for the State and prosecute when required by the governor or either branch of the legislature. Hence the mandamus should be issued.
Jines H. Graham, Plff. in Err., v. State of West Virginia, 32 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 583. Punishing habitual criminals; due process of law. A former convict
is not denied due process of law by bringing him, after conviction, before the
court of another county in a separate proceeding instituted conformable to W.
Va. Code, chap. 165, secs. 1-5, by information charging him with prior convictions, which were not alleged in the indictment on which he was last tried and
convicted, and, on the finding of the jury that he was the former convict, sentencing him to the additional punishment which chap. 152, secs. 23, 24, in such
cases prescribes.
Chester S. Jordan, Plff. in Err., v. Commonwealth of Mass., 23 Sup. Ct.
Repr. 651. Due Process of Law. One convicted of crime in a state court is
not denied due process of law because, on the motion for a new trial, based
upon the suggestion of the insanity of a juror, the state, conformably to the
local law, was only required to establish the sanity of the juror by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable doubt.
EmBEZZLEMENT.

Jackson v. State, Ala., 57 S. 110. Vendee or Agent. Under a written contract, goods were consigned to the defendant at a fixed price, payable at fixed
times. He was at liberty to sell them to any person, at any price and on any
terms he pleased, except that when he sold on credit he was required to take
a note on a form furnished by the consignor. The defendant sold a part of
the goods on credit and took the required notes from the purchasers. He then
executed his own notes to the consignor for the prices he was required by the
contract to pay, and assigned to the consignor as collateral security the notes
received from the purchasers. He collected the amounts due on the purchasers' notes, and converted this money to his own use. He said to a witness that
the money belonged to the consignor, but that he was going to keep it himself.
Held that the contract was one of sale rather than of agency. "A person to
whom goods are consigned to be sold, and who is at liberty to sell them at any
price and on any terms that he pleases, he paying a fixed price to the -owner,
is not an agent, but a vendee." But when the defendant was authorized to collect the notes given by the purchasers, which had become the property of the
consignor by the assignment, he was the agent of the consignor. Hence, when
he converted the proceeds of these notes, he thereby embezzled the money belonging to his principal, which had come into his possession by virtue of his
employment. The conviction was affirmed.
EScAPE.

Ex Parte Shores, 195 Fed. 627.. Liability of a State Sheriff in the Care of
Federal Prisoners. A sheriff in charge of a county jail in Iowa who permits
a federal prisoner legally sentenced to the jail to go at large from time to
time violates Rev. St. sec. 5409 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3658), and Code Iowa
1897, sec. 4891 et seq. punishing escapes, an "escape" being defined to be the
voluntarily or negligently permitting a person lawfully confined in jail to leave
the prison where he is confined before he is entitled to be released therefrom.
Stouse v. State, Okla. App., 119 Pac. 271. Exclusion of Evidefice. It was
claimed on appeal. that the trial court erred in excluding material evidence in
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behalf of the defendant. The record did not show what the excluded testimony
would have been. Held "when objections to a question are sustained, if it is.
.desired to reserve the question as to the competency of the testimony sought
to be introduced, for the determination of this court, the record must contain
the same, showing what the testimony of the witness would have been had he
been permitted to answer the question. Otherwise this court cannot determine
as to whether the defendant has been injured by the ruling of the trial court."
The conviction was affirmed.
.Tamison v. People, Colo., 119 Pac., 474. Dying Declaration. On a trial for
murder, a dying declaration, that the deceased had been murdered, was admitted
in evidence. Held that the statement was inadmissible as being a conclusion
or the expression of an opinion which tended to fix the degree of the homicide.
As the jury may have fixed the degree by this statement, the judgment should
be reversed. A statement that the defendant had shot the deceased was properly admitted as a dying declaration.
FORMER JEOPARDY.

State v. Van Ness, N. J., 83 At. 195. Discharge of Jury. Act March 22,
1899 (2 Comp. St. i910, p. 1844), sec. 74a, permits the court in any criminal case
to direct the verdict to be taken by the clerk of the court, and Act April 3,
1902 (2 -Comp. St. 1910 p. 1523) sec. 29 empowers the deputy clerk, in the absence of his superior, to exercise all of the powers of the latter, including the
reception of verdict. In a criminal prosecution, the court directed the clerk to
receive the verdict in his absence, and the deputy clerk on receiving word from
the jury that they could not agree discharged them.. Held, that while this act was
clearly beyond his powers, and did not relieve the jury from further consideration of the case, the jury having wrongfully disbanded without finding a verdict,
accused-cannot set up that trial as a former jeopardy;, the essence of former
jeopardy being either a former acquittal or conviction.
GRAND JURY.

Cannon v. State, Fla., 57 S. 240. May be Reconvened to Correct Mistake.
A grand jury which found an indictment against the defendant was discharged.
The term of court was adjourned until a later date, and a term held in another
county during the interval. It was discovered that the name of the victim, as
given in the indictment, was incorrect. When the term was resumed, after the
recess, the grand jury was recalled. Sixteen of the original eighteen members
returned, were sworn and charged, and without hearing any additional testimony, returned a new indictment for the same offense with the name of the
deceased correctly stated. Held that the term of court could be adjourned
and -a term held elsewhere in the interval. A grand jury that has been discharged may be recalled during the same term of court. As this jury had previously investigated the case, they could correct the error without taking additional testimony. As more than twelve members were present and conchrred
in finding the new indictment, it was immaterial that two of the original body
were not present. The conviction was affirmed.
In re Grand Jury, 135 N. Y. Supp. 103. Immunity. Under Penal Law,
Sec. 584, as-added by Laws 1910, c. 395, providing that no person shall be excused from attending and testifying before any court, magistrate, or referee on
any investigation, proceeding, or trial for violation of the-law against conspiracy, on the ground that the testimony required of him may tend to convict him
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of a crime; but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty for
or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may so
testify, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against him on
any criminal investigation, proceeding, or trial, one cannot testify before a
grand jury on an inveqtigation of a conspiracy, without becoming immune from
prosecution and punishment for the conspiracy, even though he stipulate to the
contrary.
HO IciDE.
People v. Friedman,N. Y. 98 N. E. 471. First Degree Murder. Where defendant and K. conspired to rob decedent in the night-time, and during such
robbery decedent was shot and killed, defendant would be liable for murder in
the first degree, although he did not do the actual killing, if the natural and
probable consequence of the common enterprise was the killing of the deceased
in case of resistance on his part, and hence a request to charge, assuming that
if defendant did not fire the fatal shot he could escape liability unless the conspiracy contemplated the-use of such force or violence as might cause death,
was properly refused.
INDICTMENT AND

INFORMATION.

Sumpter v. State, Fla., 57 S. 202. Sufficiency. A statute defined murder
in the second degree as caused by "an act imminently dangerous to another."
An indictment under this statute charged that the defendant assaulted deceased
with a shot gun loaded and charged with leaden balls, and discharged the said
leaden balls into the head and body of the deceased, thereby inflicting ten
mortal wounds, of which the deceased did die. After conviction, it was objected that the indictment did not allege that the act was imminently dangerous
to another. Held that the courts will take judicial notice that the facts charged
constitute an act imminently dangerous to the person shot at, and that it would
be superfluous to state that such an act was dangerous. The conviction was
affirmed.
Marsh v. State, Ala., 57 S. 387. Variance. On trial of an indictment for
larceny of a cow, proof of the larceny of a bull calf is a fatal variance. Legally
the word Eow is restricted to the female of the bovine species. A former decision that the word cow included a heifer was distinguished.
State v. Ireland et al. Me. 83 Atl. 453. Substituting Copy of Lost Indictment. Copy of a lost or mislaid indictment may be substituted by order of the
trial court as soon as the loss is discovered and before the case is submitted
to the jury, but omission to do so before conviction is not fatal; the substitution being properly made upon satisfactory evidence at a forthcoming nisi prius
term.
Bennett v. United States, 194 Fed. 630. Variance. An indictment, charging defendant with inducing the interstate transportation for an unlawful purpose of Opal Clark, and evidence that the woman transported was known to
defendant as Jeanette Clark, and that her real name was entirely different, did
not constitute a variance, in view of the fact that the record clearly indicated
the identity of the woman named in the indictment with the woman whom
defendant must have known to the one intended to be named and with the
woman who was actually transported.
Burchett v. United States, 194 Fed. 821. Records. - The record in a criminal case should show that the grand jury which returned the indictment was
425
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duly' sworn. That the grand jury which returned the indictment was duly
sworn is sufficiently shown by a recital in a record that the grand jury was
"impaneled" and by a recital in the caption of the indictment that the grand
jurors were impaneled, sworn, and charged.
United States v. Winslow et al., 195 Fed. 578. Demurrer. Where the questions raised by demurrer to an indictment are both intricate and doubtful, the
demurrer may be overruled, and their decision postponed until the trial on the
merits.
INSTRUCTIONS.

Flowers v. State, Miss., 57 S. 226. Error without Prejudice. Defendant
was indicted for assault and battery with intent to murder. It was proved that
he shot at another and with intent to murder her, but failed to hit her. The
court charged that if the jury found the defendant was guilty of assault with
intent to murder they should find him guilty as charged in the indictment and
he was convicted. Held that on. this indictment the defendant could be convicted of the offense of assault with intent to murder,, and a charge to that
effect would have been correct. The same punishment would have been imposed
had the conviction been for assault with intent to murder. Hence the error
was harmless, although the defendant was convicted of a battery which he had
not committed. But the court will not reverse a judgment for an error not
prejudiced to the party complaining. Hence the conviction was affirmed.
Barker v. State, Ala. App., 57 S. 88. Modification of the Instructions. At
defendant's request, the court gave a written charge as to reasonable doubt,
remarking "this is a fool charge, but I will give it to you, gentlemen of the
jury, as the Supreme Court has said that it is good law; but in my opinion it is
misleading." A statute provided "charges moved for by either party must be
in writing, and must be given or refused in the terms in which they are written."' Held the comment upon the written charge constituted a modification of
the instruction, as the jury would not give it respectful consideration, when the
court expressed the opinion that the proposition was not good la,% but mere
foolishness and misleading. The conviction was reversed.
Hay v. State, Ind. 98 N. E. 172. Harmless Error. Under Burns Ann. St.
1908, sec. 2221, which provides that the Supreme Court in appeals in criminal
cases shall disregard technical errors and defects which did not prejudice the
substantial rights of the accused, an instruction in a prosecution for seduction,
erroneously giving corroborative effect to the fact that prosecutrix had made
preparations for marriage, was harmless where, with all the evidence as to such
preparations eliminated, the jury could not have failed to convict.
JURY.

People v. Toledo, 135 N. Y. Supp. 49. Waiver of Objections. In a prosecution for a felony, where one juror became ill after the evidence was all in,
thus causing a mistrial, and accused and his attorney consented to a new trial
before a second jury composed of one new juror and the eleven old ones, to
whom the entire testimony was read, a conviction by that jury was valid; for
while one accused of a felony cannot be legally tried upon an indictment except
by a jury of twelve men, .and a conviction of any less number is invalid, though
defendant agrees to waive his rights, yet accused, though entitled to a jury of
twelve new men, had the right to waive objection to the eleven old jurors.
In a prosecution for a felony, where one juror became ill after the evidence
426
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was all in, thus causing a mistrial, and accused and his attorney consented to
a new) trial before a second jury composed of one new juror and the eleven
old ones, accused is entitled to have all of the witnesses produced before the
jury, though his consent to the reading of their testimoni as taken in the
former trial is a waiver of his rights.
LARCENY.

People v. Harold, Cal. App., 119 Pac., 949. Distinguished from False Pretences. The defendant was convicted of grand larceny upon proof that by
fraud, trick and device, he induced the prosecutor to agree to buy from a third
party certain moving picture films of little or no value, and received from the
prosecutor $145 to be paid for the films, paid some of the money to the third
party and put the balance of it in his own pocket. The defendant and the third
party had conspired to defraud the prosecutor and the defendant intended to
steal the money when he received it. The prosecutor intended the $145 to be
paid to the third party for the films. Held that as the defendant purported
to be acting for the prosecutor, so long as the money remained in the hands
of the defendant it was the prosecutor's money. As the defendant then intended to steal it, and accomplished his purpose, the crime committed was larceny rather than obtaining money under false pretences.
LorrERis.
United States v. Purvis, 195 Fed. 618. Acts Constituting a Lottery. A
company operated a scheme containing investment and loan features. The
opportunity to obtain a loan was determined to a large extent by the way in
which the applications were received at the office of the company, and where a
number of applications were received at the_ sametime they were put on the
records of the company as they were opened and recorded. The investment
features were not particularly attractive, and the main feature of the scheme
was the loan feature, and the propsed loan contracts contained attractive terms.
Held, that the scheme was a lottery because of a consideration and because of
the existence of chance, based on obtaining a low number and thereby obtaining a loan, and because the obtaining of a loan at an early date was the prize
in the scheme, since to constitute a lottery there must be a consideration, chance,
and prize.
PARDONING POWER.

In re Opinioin of the Justices. Mass, 98 N. E. 101. Extent of Pardoning
Power. Under Const. p. 2, c. 2, sec. 1, art. 8, vesting the power to pardon offenses, except after conviction by impeachment, in the Governor, by and with
the advice of counsel, conditional pardons or commutations or respites of sentences can be granted only in conformity to the advice of counsel; the words
"power of pardoning offenses" including not only absolute pardons, but also
lesser exercises of clemency.
PERJURY.

Allen v. United States, 194 Fed. 664. Double Jeopardy. One may be con,victed of perjury for testifying falsely in his own behalf of his trial for counterfeiting of which he is acquitted, and is not thereby twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense, but the government should not institute a prosecution for
perjury on substantially the same evidence presented on the trial for counterfeiting.
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PLACE OF OFFENSE.

United States v. Reddin et al., 193 Fed. 798. Place of Offense. Shipment
in Indiana of dynamite or nitroglycerine in interstate commerce by participants
in a conspiracy to violate the federal laws against such shipment was the act
of all the conspirators, permitting trial in Indiana of conspirators found in
another state.
POLLING JURY.

McCullough v. State, Ga. App., 73 S. E. 546. Denial Reversible Error.
In a case in which the defendant's guilt was doubtful, the jury, after several
hours of consideration, returned a verdict of guilty. While the jury was still
standing, and without giving counsel for the defendant time to demand a poll
of the jury, the judge imposed the following sentence, "Twenty years in the
penitentiary." Held that the judge had deprived the accused of his right to
have the jury polled, or at least impaired the value of the right, as the strong
approval of the verdict by the court "would have induced any wavering juror
to abandon any intended dissent." The conviction -was reversed.
PROBATION

STATUTE.

Gehriann v. Osborne, Warden, N. J., 82 At. 424. Suspending Sentence.
Jurisdiction of a court to suspend the sentencing of a person convicted of an
offense and to thereafter impose sentence, either before or after the term, was
not taken away by P. L. 1900, p. 289, repealed by P. L. 1906, p. 104, c. 74, and
re-enacted by chapter 75, p. 104, of the laws of that year providing a system of
probation in the punishment of criminals. The term "suspended sentence," as
used in criminal law, refers to the suspension of the execution of a sentence
already imposed, and-not correctly to the suspending of sentence.
PURE FooD L~w.
State v. Gruber, Minn., 133 N. W. 571. Sale in Another State. The defendant was a traveling salesman for a company incorporated and located in
the state of New York. While in Minnesota, he took an -order for candy, subject to accept-4nce or rejection by the company, and sent it to the company's
place of business in New York. This candy was shipped from New York and
received by- the customer in Minnesota. It contained coal tar dye. The Minnesota statutes prohibited the sale of candy containing coal tar dye. Held that
the legislature could not and did not prohibit the sale of such candy outside
the state, nor did it prohibit the shipment of such candy into the state. As the
sale took place in New York it was not a violation of the statute. As the sale
was not a crime the defendant did not become a criminal by aiding and abetting
it in Minnesota, especially if it was not a crime in New York. Taking the order
was not a part of the sale, so that no part of the sale took place in Minnesota.
Hence the conviction was reversed.
REFORmATORY ACT.

People v. Smith, Ill., 97 N. E. 649. Age of Offender. Reformatory Act
(Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 118, sec. 10) divides persons who may be sentenced
thereunder into two classes, viz., males between 10 and 16 years of age, and
males between 16 and 21. Section 11 provides that a boy between 10 and 16
years of age "shall be committed" to the reformatory; while section 9 provides that both classes "may be sentenced" to the reformatory. Section 10
declares that in all criminal cases tried by a jury, where it is found that the
defendant is between 10 and 21 years of age, the jury shall not fix the punish,428
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ment, unless it shall also appear. that defendant has been previously sentenced
to the penitentiary, or that the offense is a capital one and Parole Law, sec. 1
(Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 38, sec. 498), excepts from its application treason,
murder, rape, and kidnapping. Held, that the parole law was not intended to
destroy by implication the application of the reformatory act to males between
the ages of 10 and 21, convicted of rape; but that the word "may" in section 9
of the reformatory act should be construed to mean "must;" and hence a boy
of 19, on being convicted of rape could not be properly sentenced to the penitentiary.
Under Reformatory Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 118), a 10, providing for
sentence of criminals under 21 years of age to the reformatory, where accused was convicted of rape, committed when he was 19 years old, and, at the
time of the sentence, he was a male person over 21 years, he was not subject
to sentence, either to the reformatory or to the penitentiary.
SELF-DEFENSE.

State v. Short, (Dela.), 82 Atl. 239. Duty to Retrial. In repelling an assault, no more force than is necessary- may be used, and one assaulted cannot
take the life of his assailant, where by retreat he may escape death or great
bodily harm.
Sandford v. State, -Ala., 57 S. 134. Defense at Dwelling. A man who is
attacked at his dwelling by another does not have the right to stand his ground
and if necessary, kill his adversary, unless he is free from fault in bringing on
the difficulty, and is acting under an impending necessity to protect himself or
his home.
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
Powers v. U. S., 32 Supreme Court Rep. 281. The admission in evidence
at the trial of the testimony of the accused, voluntarily and understandingly
given at the preliminary hearing, does not violate his privilege against selfcrimination accorded by U. S. Const., 5th Amend., although he was not warned
at the time that what he said might be used against him.
TRIAL.
Leach v. State,-Ind., 97 N. E. 793. Harmless Error. Under Burns' Ann.
St. 1908,.a 2221, which requires technical defects in action of the trial court
not prejudicing accused's substantial rights to be disregarded, any error in permitting a witness for the state to refresh her memory from a memorandum, and
i, refusing to require her to deliver the memorandum to accused's counsel for
examination, was harmless, where the other evidence conclusively established
accused's guilt.
State v. Brown. (N. J.), 82 Atl. 302. Harmless Error. One challenging
the validity of his conviction of crime under Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp.
St. 1910, p. 1863) a 136, may not obtain a reversal on the ground of inaccuracies in the instructions not producing manifest injury.
Diaz v. U. S., 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250. Waiving Personal Presence. One accused of an offense not capital, who is not in custody, and who was present
when the frial was begun, may waive his right under the act of July 1, 1902,
a 5, enacting a Bill of Rights for the Philippine Islands, to be personally present at every stage of the trial (Lamar, J., dissenting.)
SHIPPING.
United States v. Jones, 195 Fed. 860. Wireless Equipment of Passenger
429
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Vessels. In the prosecution of the captain of- a steamship under Act June 24,
1910, c. 379, 36 Stat. 629 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1265), which makes
it a punishable offense for the master of any ocean going vessel carrying passengers, and carrying 50 or more persons, including passengers and crew, to
leave any port of the United States on a voyage of more than 200 miles, unless
equipped with a wireless telegraph apparatus, a plea setting up that the vessel
did not carry passengers is insufficient where it also admits that the vessel
carried to Europe four persons, not members of her regular crew, who contributed a fund of $200 to one of th& officers for extra food and accommodations, but avers that they paid nothing for transportation, but were assigned
as members of the crew at a shilling a month although they were not paid and
performed no services; the question of whether they were or were not in fact
passengers being-one for the jury under the facts.
SUSPENDED

SENTENCE.

Fuller v. State, Miss., 57 S. 6. Common Law Power. The defendant was
convicted of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors and sentenced to be fined
and imprisoned in the county jail for ninety days and pay the costs of the
prosecution. It was further ordered that the jail sentence be suspended during
the good behavior of the defendant. Defendant paid the fine and costs and
was released. Later, on motion of the District Attorney and proof that he was
still selling liquor illegally, the court adjudged that he had violated the condition, and ordered him to serve the suspended sentence. There was no statute
authorizing the court to suspend the sentence. Held that at common law the
power to suspend sentence in a criminal action is inherent in every court of
record. This power is distinguished from the executive power to grant reprieves and pardons, as "the suspension of sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely; but the conviction and the liability following it, and all civil disabilities remain and become operative when
judgment is rendered," while a pardon "removes the penalties and disabilities
and restores the offender to all his civil rights." Hence the order was affirmed.
TRIAL.

Martin v. State, Ga. App., 73 S. E. 686. Absence of the Judge. While the
jury were considering their verdict in a criminal case, the presiding judge left
the county, and opened a special court in' another county. He evidently returned to receive the verdict. It was not shown that the defendant was prejudiced by the absence of the judge. The evidence fully authorized the conviction, and there was no showing that the verdict was affected by any improper
influence, or that the jurors -knew that the judge was absent from the county,
or that the verdict was in any way affected by that fact. Held that the personal supervision and control of the presiding judge is essential to a legal
trial. When the judge left the county, the court ceased, for the time being at
least, to exist in that county, and all that was done during his absence was
nugatory and void. The case was distinguished from cases in which the judge
was temporarily absent, but remained within the call of the jury. The Supreme
Court had held that such temporary absence did not invalidate the verdict.
Pdople v..Schafer, Cal., 119 Pac., 920. Challenge of Juror. The trial court
disallowed a challenge for cause, and the jury was then challenged peremptorily. The defendant subsequently exhausted his peremptory challenges, but
it did not appear that he had occasion or desire to use an addi tional peremptory
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challenge, or that the jurors finally accepted were not entirely satisfactory to
him. Held that even though the trial court erred in disallowing the challenge,
yet it was without prejudice in the absence of a showing that an objectionable
juror was thereby forced upon the defendant. The conviction was affirmed.
Callahan v. United States, 195 Fed. 924. Ground for Continuance. A
defendant in a criminal case in a state court, who while at large on bail pending an appeal from a judgment of conviction which is afterward affirmed, commits a crime against the United States, cannot be heard himself to ask for a
continuance of the trial of the case against him in the federal court, on the
ground that he has not served the sentence imposed by the state court.
VARIANCE BETWEEN INDICTMENT AND

PROOF.

Cain v. State, Ga. App., 73 S. E. 623. Allegations according to Legal Effect.
An indictment for perjury alleged that the oath was administered by the presiding magistrate. The proof was that it was administered by an attorney at
law, by the authority or permission of the court. Held the attorney acted in
behalf of the court so that in legal effect it was administered by the presiding
magistrate. Consequently there was no variance.
VARIANCE.

Clark v. State, Miss., 5 S.. 209. Name of Victim. Defendant was convicted on an indictment charging the murder of one Tode Wallace. The bill
of exceptions showed that he killed Tode Hollis. He moved for a new trial
on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, and
appealed from the order denying the motion. A statute provided that such a
variance between the indictment and proof could be amended in the trial court.
Another statute provided that no judgment should be reversed unless the record
showed that the errors complained of were made the ground of special exception in the trial court. The name of the deceased in the bill of exceptions had
in most cases been written Tode Wallace, and then changed to Hollis. The
stenographer made an affidavit that the deceased was called Wallace by the
witnesses, but that one of the attorneys called him Hollis, and that the stenographer in transcribing his notes thought he had probably made a mistake in
taking the name from the witness as Wallace and consequently had made the
correction in the transcript. Held that the record could not be contradicted
by parol evidence. It was immaterial that the indictment could have been
amended so as to conform to the proof, since this was not done. The statute
forbidding a reversal unless the error complained of was specially excepted to
does not apply when the offense charged has not been proved. "It will be a
sad, sad day in the jurisprudence of any country when the courts will permit
one of its citizens to be hung for the commission of a crime of which the
record made by the State completely and fully acquits him of the charge. The
standing aside from the beaten path of immemorial usage, worn hard and bare
by the footsteps of our forefathers in the law, in order to make way for the
passing of the funeral cortege, brought about by a too liberal construction of
a criminal statute enacted in derogation of the common law, is the recognition
and enforcement of too dangerous a doctrine to comport with the humane and
beneficent conduct of a civilized court. *- * * The question which this record presents is not what may be termed a technicality in any sense of the term.
It is a matter of substantive right. To permit a person to be hanged when the
evident shows that he was convicted for the murder of a person different from
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the one charged in the indictment is absolutely shocking in the extreme. Our
conscience recoils with absolute horror from such a proposition."
One judge dissented on the ground that the defect could have been cured
by amending the indictment to conform to the proof, and that the defendant,
by failing to call attention to the variance, had waived his right to have the
amendment made. The conviction was reversed.
O'Neal v. State, Ga. App., 73 S. E. 695. Person Injured. The indictment
charged that the defendant, by false pretences, induced one Hutchinson to cash
a check. The proof was that Hutchinson was assistant cashier of a bank. The
defendant induced Hutchinson to cash the check with the bank's money, as its
agent. On learning that the check was worthless, Hutchinson paid the bank
the amount lost, out of his own pocket, in accordance with a custom of the
bank that any loss resulting from the work of Hutchinson should be sustained
by him. Held that the crime was complete when Hutchinson paid out the
bank's money for the worthless check. The subsequent indemnification of the
bank did not relate back to the time when the offense was committed. It was
the bank, and not Hutchinson as an individual, that was cheated and defrauded.
Hence there was a fatal variance between the allegations and the proof.
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